Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Reconceptualizing the Future of
Environmental Law
Spring 2015

Article 12

April 2015

How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to State Based Climate
Change Initiatives: A Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey and New York State Programs
Lauren Baron
Pace University School of Law, lbaron@law.pace.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law
Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lauren Baron, How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to State Based Climate Change
Initiatives: A Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey and New York State
Programs, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 564 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

12_BARON

FINAL_EDITED_NUM_USE

10/1/2015 10:45 AM

COMMENT

How to Avoid Constitutional Challenges to
State Based Climate Change Initiatives: A
Case Study of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
v. Corey and New York State Programs
Lauren Baron*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the absence of coordinated national efforts, States have
taken it upon themselves to reduce harmful carbon emissions and
combat climate change using various programs and methods.1
The President has made recommendations regarding national
action to reduce emissions, however, there has been no legislative
or all-encompassing national standards set.
Through the
President’s Climate Action Plan (hereinafter “President’s Plan”),
the President requires the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to create rules pertaining to carbon emissions under the
Clean Air Act (CAA) § 111(d), which the agency has recently
* Pace University School of Law J.D. & Environmental Law Certificate
Candidate, 2015; B.A., Cum Laude, Ecosystem Science and Policy with
departmental honors in Sociology from the University of Miami (FL), 2012. The
author would like to thank her colleagues at the Pace Energy and Climate
Center, who encouraged her interest in energy law. The author would also like
to thank the Pace Environmental Law Review editors and associates for their
work on this comment.
1. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing
Massachusetts’s RPS program); 6 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 242-1.1
(2008) (establishing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State);
OR. REV. STAT. § 36.469A (2007) (establishing Oregon’s RPS program); Order
Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In the Matter of a Renewable
Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004), available at
www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s RPS).
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proposed.2 As states continue to take individual action, concerns
have arisen regarding the possibility of constitutional violations.3
In 2006, due to a lack of national action on climate change,
California became a first mover by enacting the Low Carbon Fuel
Standard (LCFS) in order to reduce emissions from the
transportation sector and limit California’s exposure to the
negative effects of climate change.4 It quickly became the target
of legal challenges under the Commerce Clause.
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, representatives of the instate and out-of-state corn ethanol industry, and American Fuels,
representatives of petrochemical refineries and manufacturers,
brought constitutional challenges against the California Air
Resources Board for enacting the LCFS.5 The parties alleged the
LCFS violates the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and is preempted by section 211(o) of
the CAA, which is part of the Renewable Fuel Standard (“RFS”),
as well as the Energy Independence and Securities Act.6 Rocky
Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey (hereinafter “Rocky Mtn. v.
Corey”) reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2013, and
the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in July 2014.7
Although certiorari was denied, the outcome of the case has had a
major impact on how other states can argue the constitutional
validity of state enacted emissions reduction programs, and is
2. Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan,
June
2013,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf [hereinafter President’s Climate Action
Plan]; JANE A. LEGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CLIMATE
ACTION PLAN (May 28, 2014); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
3. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d
1031 (9th Cir. 2007); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014
WL 1612331, at *13 (D. Minn. 2014); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,
730 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013).
4. CAL . CODE REGS . tit. 17, § 95480 (2013).
5. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 740 F.3d 507 (2014), cert.
denied, 134 U.S. 2875 (2014).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2012); Corey, 730 F.3d at 1077; Michael R. Barr et al.,
Recent Litigation, 6-85 CA ENVTL. L. & LAND USE PRAC. § 85.03(4) (2014).
7. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, cert. denied, 134 U.S. 2875.
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already being referred to in cases outside the Ninth Circuit.8
After remand, it is possible the case could come back up through
the Ninth Circuit and appear before the Supreme Court.
Considering the decision in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and the
EPA’s actions in accordance with the President’s Plan, this
comment will outline best practices states can use in creating
climate initiatives based on the challenges California faced in
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. Part II of this comment will analyze the
reasoning in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. Although certiorari was denied
in the case, Part II will analyze recent Supreme Court dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence to determine which cases are
relevant to consider when analyzing a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to state based climate initiatives. Part III will discuss
the current Federal Climate Action Plan and relevant provisions
of the CAA, focusing on 111(d), and what states should consider
when implementing climate initiatives to avoid constitutional
challenges. Part IV will highlight New York State based climate
initiatives as a case study. Like California’s LCFS, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) and New York’s Renewable
Portfolio Standard (hereinafter “NYS RPS”) faced scrutiny as to
whether the regulations violate the dormant Commerce Clause.9
Part IV will also discuss how RGGI and the NYS RPS
demonstrate how States can act locally and regionally applying
best practices to create legally defensible climate initiatives.10

8. Corey, 740 F.3d at 507, cert. denied, 134 U.S. 2875 (denial of motion for
rehearing en banc and inference that the parties will most likely file for
certiorari); see Heydinger, 2014 WL 1612331, at *20; Carolyn Whetzel, Ethanol
Groups Seek Supreme Court Review of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.bna.com/ethanol-groups-seekn17179888987/ (discussing how a petition for certiorari was filed on March 20,
2014).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see generally Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.
Co., 125 U.S. 465, 479 (1888).
10. This comment will focus only on dormant Commerce Clause challenges,
however the author recognizes there are other constitutional challenges that can
be brought against a state climate initiative of which states should be aware.
Some potential constitutional challenges include a federal preemption challenge
under the Supremacy Clause or a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.
Theoretically, if a state complies with the dormant Commerce Clause, federal
law would not apply, so preemption would no longer be an issue, and the action
would be non-discriminatory avoiding an Equal Protection challenge.
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ORIGINS OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS
UNION V. COREY

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey focuses on the
constitutionality of California’s LCFS. Part II.a. discusses the
history and pertinent provisions of the LCFS that were
challenged in the case. Part II.b. gives an overview of the
dormant Commerce Clause. Part II.c. provides an overview of
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and describes the reasoning the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals used to determine the LCFS does not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Part II.d. describes
relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence to consider when
defending a state-based climate initiative from a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge.
A. Overview of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 established
ambitious climate change legislation for the state of California.11
The act established a cap-and-trade system and included a
requirement that the State’s greenhouse gas emissions level must
reach the emissions level in 1990 by the year 2020.12 In order to
meet the required emissions levels, the act granted the California
Air Resources Board (CARB) the power to enact appropriate
legislation to reduce emissions.13
Greenhouse gas emissions from transportation constitute
more than forty percent of California’s emissions.14 In an effort
to decrease the amount of emissions from this major source,
California’s LCFS focuses on reducing the greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the production and use of
transportation fuels.15 For a fuel to be sold in the California

11. Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL . H EALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3850138599 (West 2006).
12. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(a) (2014).
13. Id. § 2.04(5)(b).
14. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079.
15. CAL . CODE REGS . tit. 17, § 95480.1(a) (2013).
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market it must meet a specific carbon intensity level enforced by
CARB.16
California’s primary goal of enacting the LCFS is to promote
alternative fuels with less carbon emissions and deter carbon
intensive fuel sources such as crude oil from being utilized in the
market.17 The LCFS standard applies to both gasoline and
alternative fuels.18 The entire lifecycle of the fuel is taken into
account, from the extraction or production of the feedstock
through the use of the fuel in a vehicle, otherwise known as a
pathways analysis.19 California’s lifecycle analysis is based on
the federally established and peer reviewed GREET pathway
analysis that the Environmental Protection Agency uses in the
RFS.20 The calculation considers the feedstock used to produce
the fuel, the source of electricity for production, the distance the
fuel must travel to the California market, and the emissions from
the use of the fuel.21 Similar to the National RFS, California set
up a credit trading system where a fuel producer may produce a
higher carbon intensity fuel, and offset the emissions by
purchasing credits from fuel producers with a carbon budget
deficit.22 A more carbon intensive fuel can enter the California
market, but in order to make a profit the fuel producer should
ensure the cost of purchasing carbon credits will be recovered
through retail fuel sales.23
In 2011, CARB established initial carbon intensity standards
for crude oil.24 In creating the carbon intensity standards for
crude oil, CARB considered the make-up of the fuel market in
16. Id. at §§ 95481(a)(16), 95486, 95490 (defining carbon intensity as “the
amount of lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel
delivered, expressed in grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per megajoule”).
17. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079-80.
18. CAL . CODE REGS . tit. 17, § 95480.1(a).
19. Id. tit. 17, § 95486(a)(2) (describing how a pathway analysis of the
production of any type of fuel includes evaluation of feed stocks used to produce
the fuel, production technology, geographic region, mode of transportation, and
the amount and type of thermal and electrical energy consumed during
production).
20. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081-82.
21. Tit. 17, § 95486(a).
22. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(7) (2012), with tit. 17, § 95485(c).
23. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d at 1080.
24. Id. at 1084-85.
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2006.25 It distinguished high carbon intensity crude oil (HCICO)
from non-HCICO, and existing sources of crude from emerging
sources of crude.26 The distinction between HCICOs and nonHCICOs was made to reduce emissions and encourage
investment into alternative fuel development instead of
investment in better ways to extract crude.27 Shortly after
establishing the standards for crude oil, CARB determined basing
the current carbon intensity levels on the 2006 calculations was
infeasible, and amended the LCFS so that all crude oil would be
assigned the higher carbon intensity level from either the year of
sale or the average for 2010,28 meaning “all crude oil is assessed
the same carbon intensity value” regardless of where it is
produced.29 The amendment was made because the regulation as
written was burdensome on in-state oil refiners and benefited
out-of-state crude oil due to the potential for “fuel shuffling,”
which occurs when high carbon intensity fuels shift to other
markets rather than stay in the California market, thus
decreasing the demand for California produced crude and
harming California based crude producers.30
B. Explanation of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution, but courts have read it into the Commerce Clause.31
Dormant Commerce Clause issues emerge when Congress “has
not affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the
challenged state activity.”32 In order to evaluate whether a state
action violates the dormant Commerce Clause, courts consider if
25. Id. at 1085-86.
26. Id. at 1085.
27. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1085-86.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1085.
31. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125
U.S. 465, 479 (1888) (holding that an Iowa law requiring certificate stating the
person to whom the out-of-state liquor was being sold could actually sell the
liquor before being permitted into the state violated the Commerce Clause
because it discriminated against the citizens and products of other states).
32. 3 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.03(3)(b) (2014) (citing Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)).
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the action: (1) has an extraterritorial effect; (2) is facially
discriminatory or has a discriminatory intent and a
discriminatory effect in practice; and (3) indirectly burdens
interstate commerce.33 Heightened judicial scrutiny applies if a
party is able to show the regulation has a discriminatory effect in
practice because it has an extraterritorial effect.34 A regulation
violates the concept of extraterritoriality if it controls commerce
outside the boundaries of the enacting state.35
A regulation facially discriminates when it clearly benefits
in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic or directly
gives a benefit to in-state economic interests, but denies that
benefit to out-of-state economic interests.36 If the regulation
facially discriminates, strict scrutiny applies, and the state action
is presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state can show the
regulation uses the least restrictive means to achieve an
important non-protectionist interest.37 After considering whether
a state action facially discriminates and has an extraterritorial
effect, a court must consider whether the state enacted the
regulation with a discriminatory intent or with the purpose of
disadvantaging out-of-state businesses or benefitting in-state
businesses.38
Courts must also consider the discriminatory effect by
examining whether there is a disparate impact on out-of-state
businesses.39 The regulation or state action will have a disparate
33. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084
(E.D. Cal. 2011); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce §§ 40, 103 (2014); see Corey, 730
F.3d at 1087. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S.
644, 669 (2003); Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
34. 15A AM. JUR. 2D Commerce § 40.
35. Id.; see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
36. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087 (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994)) (Discrimination “simply means differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter.”).
37. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (1970); see Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994); see also C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown,
511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
38. See generally Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant
Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 306 (2013) (citing Bacchus
Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984)).
39. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992).
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impact when its effects result in negative repercussions for a
disproportionate amount of out-of-state businesses over in-state
businesses.40 Finally, after the analysis of whether a regulation
facially discriminates, or has a discriminatory effect and
discriminatory purpose, a court must analyze the regulation
under the Pike balancing test.41 The Pike test directs the court to
balance the burdens the regulation imposes on interstate
commerce versus the benefits of the regulation.42
One method a state can use to defend against a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge is the market participant
exception.43 Courts have determined states should have the
ability to freely participate in the marketplace as “guardian and
trustee for its people.”44 The market participant exception may
apply when a state seeks to regulate in a particular area where
the State itself participates in that particular market.45 A state
acts as a market participant when it directly participates in the
market.46 Under such circumstances, a state is permitted to
“engage in otherwise discriminatory practices . . . so long as the
state is acting as a market participant, rather than as a market
regulator.”47 However, the market participant exception is not a
complete solution to a potential dormant Commerce Clause
violation. If a court reaches the Pike balancing test and reveals
that the burdens placed on interstate commerce outweigh the
40. Lee & Duane, supra note 38, at 303.
41. Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4); see generally Pike, 397 U.S. 137.
42. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d
1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013).
43. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (“Nothing in
the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others.”).
44. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980) (“There is no indication
of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate
freely in the free market.”); see also Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810.
45. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 362 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)
(“[I]n this kind of case there is ‘a single inquiry: whether the challenged
‘program constituted direct state participation in the market.’”) (quoting Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 435 (1980)).
47. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 362 (quoting S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984)).
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benefits of the regulation, the market participant exception
cannot save the regulation from being struck down as
constitutionally invalid.48
C. Overview of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, representatives of the instate and out-of-state corn ethanol industry, and American Fuels,
representatives of petrochemical refineries and manufacturers,
separately sued the CARB and eventually joined their claims.49
The parties alleged the LCFS violated the dormant Commerce
Clause and Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.50
Additionally, the parties alleged the RFS, as well as the Energy
Independence and Securities Act, preempted the LCFS.51 The
main argument was that the regulation facially discriminated
against
fuel
producers
based
on
origin,
therefore
unconstitutionally discriminating against out-of-state fuel
producers in favor of in-state fuel producers.52
When the case was first consolidated, the head of the CARB
was James Goldstene. He was eventually succeeded by Richard
Corey, causing a change in the case name as it navigated the
court system.53 At the district court level in Rocky Mtn. Farmers
Union v. Goldstene (hereinafter “Rocky Mtn. v. Goldstene”),
economic balkanization or isolation of the market was a major
concern.54 The district court thought the LCFS isolated the
48. Id. at 345-46.
49. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1042,
1046-47 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Order on Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion)
(“Plaintiffs initiated separate actions to challenge California’s LCFS.”).
50. Id.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070,1077 (9th Cir. 2013); Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4).
52. Corey, 730 F.3d.at 1077-78.
53. See News Release, ARB Announces Appointment of New Executive Officer,
CALIFORNIA EPA, AIR RESOURCE BOARD (April 5, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.
gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=424.
54. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1101; Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1092. See also H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 554 (1949) (“ [F]ear that judicial
toleration of any state regulations of local phases of commerce will bring about
what they call ‘Balkanization’ of trade in the United States—trade barriers so
high between the states that the stream of interstate commerce cannot flow over
them.”).
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California fuel market from the rest of the nation, and the
regulation facially discriminated based on origin of the fuel.55
Therefore, the court granted a preliminary injunction and a
partial motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
finding the regulation, “violated the dormant commerce clause by
(1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially
discriminating
against
out-of-state
ethanol,
and
(3)
discriminating against out-of-state crude oil in purpose and
effect.”56
The district court did not reach the Pike balancing test and
stopped at the analysis of the parties’ dormant Commerce Clause
and preemption arguments under the required standards
established through dormant Commerce Clause and preemption
jurisprudence.57 The district court found that the LCFS is not
expressly preempted by § 211(c)(4), and the LCFS and § 211(o) do
not conflict with each other.58 However, it did find the LCFS is
still subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny despite CARB’s
assertion it was not.59 The district court further determined that
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union and the ethanol industry
plaintiffs actually did not have standing to bring a preemption
claim against CARB.60 The court of appeals did not directly
address the preemption issue as the district court did, but agreed
with the district court that the LCFS is not a preempted state
action and did not accept CARB’s argument that California is
exempt from Commerce Clause challenges.61
The court of appeals ultimately remanded the case to the
district court after determining the LCFS was not facially
discriminatory and was not preempted by federal legislation. The
remand required the district court to again evaluate whether the
regulation discriminates in purpose or effect and if not, to apply

55. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1092.
56. Id. at 1105; Barr et al., supra note 6, § 85.03(4).
57. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1100-07; 5A-35 BARRY S. SHANOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 35.11(2)(c) (2014).
58. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1061.
59. Id. at 1047.
60. Id. at 1098-99.
61. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106; Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
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the Pike balancing test.62 The appellate court in Rocky Mtn. v.
Corey describes the process to get to the Pike test as follows:
If a statute discriminates against out-of-state entities on its face,
in its purpose, or in its practical effect, it is unconstitutional
unless it ‘serves a legitimate local purpose, and this purpose
could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory
means.’63

The Pike test requires the court to balance the burdens on
interstate commerce against the benefits of the regulation for the
state enacting the regulation.64 On remand, the district court
will analyze whether the LCFS discriminates in purpose or effect;
if the LCFS does discriminate in purpose or effect, the court must
determine whether it places an undue burden on interstate
commerce under Pike v. Bruce Church.65 The Pike standard
requires the plaintiff to show “that the Fuel Standard imposes a
burden on interstate commerce that is ‘clearly excessive’ in
relation to its local benefits.”66 The court must consider whether
there are different burdens imposed on in-state and out-of-state
fuel producers; and if the burdens are different, the court must
weigh the burdens placed on the out-of-state fuel producers
against the benefits of the LCFS.67 The nature of the burden
must be considered and whether the goals of the government
regulation could be accomplished using less restrictive or less
burdensome means.68 As described above, the court of appeals
agreed with the district court’s determination of the preemption
issue, so this issue will not be re-addressed on remand.69
The court of appeals notes in its decision for remand that “a
regulation is not facially discriminatory simply because it affects
62. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078; see also Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 509 (9th Cir. 2014) (“And we instructed the district court to
apply strict scrutiny to those provisions if it found that they did discriminate, or
to apply the balancing test set forth in [Pike] if it found that they did not.”).
63. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
64. Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
65. Id.
66. Id.; Corey, 730 F.3d at 1078.
67. SHANOFF, supra note 57, § 35.11(2)(b).
68. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
69. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106.
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in-state and out-of-state interests unequally.”70 However, usually
when a regulation is found to be facially discriminatory, it is
struck down as unconstitutional because it is difficult to overcome
the burden of strict scrutiny.71 The court of appeals determined
the LCFS bases the treatment of different fuels on carbon
intensity, not on origin.72 Fuel producers in the Midwest or in
Brazil can and do use methods that create a less carbon-intensive
fuel than some of the fuels produced within the state of
California, and the calculation factors to determine fuel intensity
apply indiscriminately across all producers.73
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also determined the
LCFS does not discriminate in effect because it does not violate
extraterritoriality.74 The LCFS does not regulate commerce
outside California state lines because it does not require other
states to adopt particular standards or impose civil or criminal
penalties for any transaction not in compliance with the LCFS
outside the state.75 The LCFS regulates fuel that is only
consumed in California.76 The regulation functions as a market
based incentive for fuel producers to enter the California market
at competitive prices by distributing less carbon intensive fuel.77
Because of the location-neutral characteristics of the LCFS, the
court of appeals determined the regulation does not discriminate
against out-of-state fuel producers, therefore strict scrutiny did
not need to be applied.78
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stressed the importance
of reducing harmful emissions that contribute to climate change

70. Id at 1089. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
71. Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-08 (1994).
72. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1090.
73. Id.
74. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1078 (“We hold that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol does
not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil
provisions (the ‘2011 Provisions’) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude
oil in purpose or practical effect. Further, the Fuel Standard does not violate the
dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation.”).
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for the state of California.79 For example, many of the state’s
inhabitants live in cities near the coastline and are threatened by
sea level rise.80 Areas of desert in the state would expand
because of climate change leading to water shortages and
migrations.81 Reducing emissions falls within the police power of
the state, because reductions help to mitigate the effects of
climate change including economic strain associated with
adaptation measures and serious public health and welfare
consequences.82
Arguably, these benefits would be shared in the national and
international communities, as a reduction in the amount of
carbon in the planet’s atmosphere would reduce the overall
Since transportation
severity of global climate change.83
emissions constitute such a large part of harmful greenhouse gas
emissions from the state, California has clear interests in taking
measures to curb climate change through emissions reductions
regulatory tools like the LCFS.84
D. Analysis of Supreme Court Dormant Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence
After denial of the request for an en banc hearing from the
court of appeals, a successful petition for certiorari from the
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union to the Supreme Court would
have side stepped the district court’s reanalysis of the case.85

79. Id. at 1106.
80. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1106.
81. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a), (b) (West 2014); Corey, 730
F.3d at 1079, 1106; see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on
Sea Level Rise: Starting Points for Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L.
REV. 521, 522 (2010).
82. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”).
83. Craig, supra note 81, at 522-23.
84. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079.
85. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir.)
(denial of motion for rehearing en banc and inference that the parties will most
likely file for certiorari), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Carolyn Whetzel,
Ethanol Groups Seek Supreme Court Review of California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.bna.com/ethanol-
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari so the case
will go back to the district court for reanalysis in accordance with
the reasoning of the court of appeals.86 In the future, however,
the Supreme Court could grant certiorari to the case as it travels
through the Ninth Circuit again, as well as a similar case because
of how important the issues are to the future of state greenhouse
gas regulation. As more states adopt regulations, laws, and
programs aimed at mitigating climate change, courts will have to
determine whether such actions violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court jurisprudence described below
involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state actions
is helpful in determining how the court might view an issue
similar to Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. Analyzing such cases is also
helpful for states to adequately draft regulations and climate
change initiatives in order to avoid such constitutional
challenges.
The ninth circuit in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey relied on the
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis of several
cases.87 One area of Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence that can be readily compared to Rocky Mtn. v.
Corey includes cases regarding environmentally based state
regulations aimed at controlling solid and hazardous waste
disposal.88 The purpose behind such regulation was to protect
the citizens of a particular state from harmful health and
economic effects associated with waste disposal.89 Similarly, the
goal behind measures such as the LCFS, RGGI, and a state’s RPS
program is to protect state inhabitants from the harmful health
and economic effects of climate change.90 To see how the
Supreme Court may treat a state climate initiative if challenged,
this comment will discuss four cases included in the Rocky Mtn.
opinion, two of which are waste cases: Oregon Waste Systems v.
Department of Environmental Quality, Chemical Waste v. Hunt,
groups-seek-n17179888987/ (discussing that a petition for certiorari was filed on
March 20, 2014).
86. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
87. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1087.
88. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1089.
89. Id.
90. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 7.24 (2009); 9 PHILIP WEINBERG ET
AL. N.Y. PRAC., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 5:57 (2013).
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Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, and Pharmaceutical Research
& Manufacturers of America v. Walsh.91
In Oregon Waste the Supreme Court examined whether an
Oregon statute violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it
charged a higher surcharge on out-of-state waste to be put in a
The Court found the
state landfill than in-state waste.92
surcharge to be facially discriminatory; therefore, the state had to
show there was a legitimate local purpose that could not be
accomplished in a non-discriminatory way.93 The regulation
failed this test because the tax on waste was not sufficiently
similar, meaning the tax did not apply to in-state and out-of-state
waste disposers equally.94
In Chemical Waste v. Hunt, the court found a hazardous
waste disposal fee imposed on out-of-state waste and not in-state
waste violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it
regulated activity outside the state of Alabama and the only basis
for the fee was origin rather than a consideration of the harmful
risks of the waste.95
The court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey distinguished the two
regulations discussed in two abovementioned Supreme Court
cases from the LCFS, and relied on assertions from Oregon Waste
and Chemical Waste that implied if the out-of-state waste had
imposed a greater risk of harm than the waste generated within
the state, a disproportionate tax could have been justified.96 In
distinguishing the waste cases, the court stressed how the LCFS
is different because it is not facially discriminatory as it does not
base the assessment of a fuel on origin, but on carbon intensity of
the fuel pathway.97 The difference in carbon intensity values

91. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,
649 (2003); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93
(1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-44 (1992).
92. Or. Waste Sys. Inc., 511 U.S. at 96.
93. Id. at 108.
94. Id. at 100, 101, 105.
95. Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at 342-44.
96. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir.
2011). See Or. Waste Sys. Inc., 511 U.S. at 101; Chem. Waste Mgmt., 504 U.S. at
344.
97. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1093.
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reflects the costs imposed on the state of California from climate
change.98
Continuing the discussion of Supreme Court dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery, the Court found a regulation banning milk sold in
plastic, non-recyclable bottles was valid under the Equal
Protection Clause and Commerce Clause because it had minimal
impact on interstate commerce, and the state interest in
protecting the environment was very high.99 The court found the
regulation was not facially discriminatory because it was a
general ban that applied to both in-state and out-of-state milk
producers.100 The court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey relied on
Minnesota when assessing the facial discrimination of the LCFS
distinction between HCICO and non-HCICO fuels, and the
assigned carbon intensity levels.101 The court relied on the
assertion in Minnesota that a court should assume a legislative
body’s reasoning for the purpose of a piece of legislation is what
the legislative body has said it is in the statute, as well as the
general idea that a state’s environmental concern is a legitimate
one.102
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America103 is a
case involving the state of Maine and pharmaceutical companies
wishing to sell their drugs within the state. The regulation in
question required drug companies that wanted to sell medicine to
Medicaid recipients within Maine to opt into a rebate program,
which would result in lower drug costs for consumers.104 If the
company refused to opt into the program, “prior authorization” of
any medication the company wanted to sell within the state
would be required.105 This placed an additional burden on out-ofstate pharmaceutical companies. The court ultimately upheld the
regulation as constitutional and not in violation of the dormant
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1089.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981).
Id. at 471.
Corey, 730 F.3d at 1097-99.
Id.
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am., 538 U.S. at 644.
Id. at 649-50.
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Commerce Clause, because in requiring manufacturers to meet
certain economic standards in order to sell medications within
Maine, the regulation did not regulate the price of medication
In addition, in-state
outside the state boundaries.106
pharmaceutical manufacturers are subjected to the same rebate
requirements as out-of-state manufacturers, and in-state
manufacturers receive no benefits from the program that would
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.107 The Circuit
Court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey analogized the Maine case and
concluded that California, much like Maine, did not try to control
the price of fuel outside the state boundaries or control fuel
manufacturers, but only sought to alter their behavior.108 If
producers wished to enter the pharmaceutical market in Maine,
or the transportation fuel market in California, the producer has
to meet a certain standard, which is a permissible level of
influence over products to be marketed to consumers within a
state.109
III.

USING BEST PRACTICES TO AVOID
CONSTITUTIONAL DRAMA

President Obama announced his Climate Action Plan on
June 25, 2013.110 The President’s Plan consists of promises to
work with Congress on developing market-based greenhouse gas
initiatives and sets certain national reduction goals.111 The
President’s Plan directs the EPA to create rules that regulate any
newly built electric generating units and also directs the EPA to
develop rules to reduce emissions from existing power plants.112
In addition, increasing electricity generation from renewable
sources is an important part of the President’s Plan to meet
reduction goals.113
106. Id. at 669.
107. Id. at 670.
108. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1103. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am.,
538 U.S. at 679.
109. See generally Corey, 730 F.3d 1103.
110. President’s Climate Action Plan, supra note 2; LEGGETT, supra note 2.
111. LEGGETT, supra note 2, at 1.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 4.
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In accordance with the President’s directive, the EPA created
emissions standards for newly built electricity generating plants
under section 111(b) and existing electricity generators under
section 111(d) of the CAA.114 The Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of the EPA regulating carbon emissions under the
agency’s section 111 power.115 The EPA recently proposed
regulations for existing power plants that would not impact
currently enacted state-based climate initiatives.116
Section 111(d) of the CAA provides for the cooperation of
states and the EPA to reduce carbon emissions from the power
sector.117 In June 2014, EPA issued a proposed rule describing
the standards a state must meet in order to be in compliance with
the CAA.118 States have the freedom to design an emissions
reduction plan employing whatever methods the state chooses in
order to meet the EPA standards imposed under section

114. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7431 (2012); see generally Carbon
Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); Alice Kaswan, Controlling Power Plants: The CoPollutant Implications of EPA’s Clean Air Act § 111(d) Options for Greenhouse
Gases, 32 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 173, 179-80 (2014).
115. American Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538-39 (2011)
(recognizing the Clean Air Act gives the EPA power to create rules regulating
carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants displacing a federal
common law nuisance or tort claim for abatement); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007) (holding carbon dioxide falls within the definition of “air
pollutant” under the CAA and authorizes the EPA to regulate such emissions);
see also Dan Lashof, Clean Air Act is Key to Curbing Global Warming EPA Must
Cut Carbon Pollution from Existing Power Plants, 33 No. 16 WESTLAW J, ENVTL
1, Feb. 2013, at *3, available at 2013 WL 704737.
116. Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960;
Memorandum from the Comm. on Energy and Commerce Democratic Staff to
the Subcomm. on Energy and Power Democratic Members and Staff 5, 6 (June
17, 2014), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/Memo-EP-EPA-Carbon-Dioxide-Power-Plant-Regulations-20146-17.pdf.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
118. Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960 (A final rule
must be promulgated by June 2015); see President’s Climate Action Plan, supra
note 2.
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111(d).119 The freedom for states to create their own program is
unlike the Acid Rain program codified in sections 412 and 821 of
the CAA, which required states to participate in a national capand-trade system for SO2.120 States are able to reduce carbon
emissions to the applicable standards set by the EPA in multiple
ways, also known as the “toolbox” approach.121 Some examples
include renewable portfolio standards, programs similar to RGGI,
market incentives to increase the use of renewable energy at the
consumer or producer level, or the state itself investing funds into
emissions reduction measures.122
As of right now the EPA has not established a national capand-trade program for greenhouse gases under the agency’s §
111(d) power.123 In the absence of a national program, states
must act through their own regulatory machinery. Although
states can do what they want in terms of how to achieve carbon
emissions reductions, such action is still subject to the dormant
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause. There are three main
topics to consider when drafting and implementing state based
climate initiatives: language, structure and effect, and intent or
reasoning behind the state action. When enacting initiatives to
comply with the EPA’s final rule for existing power plants, states
must take into account the potential for dormant Commerce
119. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1); see Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed.
Reg. at 34,960.
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q); 40 C.F.R. § 75.1 (2014); see also Acid Rain
Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progsregs/arp/ (last updated July
25, 2012).
121. EPA, CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DESIGN OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE CARBON
POLLUTION FROM EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2013), available at http://www2.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130923statequestions.pdf.
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing
Massachusetts’s RPS program); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-1.1
(2008) (establishing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 469A.050 § 36 (West 2007) (establishing Oregon’s RPS
program); Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In the Matter
of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004),
available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s
RPS).
123. See generally Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,960
(proposed rule for creating standards).
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Clause challenges to the regulations or initiatives the state plans
to use to achieve the applicable emissions standard.
Based on the reasoning of Rocky Mtn. v. Corey and the
Supreme Court jurisprudence discussed above, a court will
consider the following topics when deciding a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge to state climate initiatives. First, language of
the state initiative is clearly important, as courts interpret the
exact meaning of the language to determine whether it facially
discriminates against out-of-state industry based on origin in
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.124 The Supreme
Court begins with a facial analysis of a regulation in the cases
discussed above.125 For example, in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the
court of appeals determined that the LCFS does not include
language that discriminates based on origin, and that the
lifecycle analysis is applied indiscriminately.126
Second, the effect of the state action is particularly important
in dormant Commerce Clause challenges.
State climate
initiatives cannot ban or restrict market entry from outside the
regulating state.127 In Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined the LCFS does not place any
impermissible restrictions on an ethanol producer from entering
the California market.128
Finally, a court will focus on the intent or reasons behind the
state action in a particular area. For example, courts consider
whether the action was taken to promote the state’s economy in
some way or only to prevent the occurrence of detrimental
124. Rocky Mountain. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1089-90 (9th
Cir. 2013). See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct.
2096, 2102 (2013) (Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act expressly
preempts certain state action).
125. See generally Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644,
661 (2003); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or. 511 U.S. 93
(1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
126. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1089.
127. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am., 538 U.S. at 649; Corey, 730
F.3d at 1102-03. States may not “attach restrictions” to market entry for out-ofstate market participants, however the LCFS does not require another state to
adopt any standards or control manufacturing in another state. Id. The LCFS
also does not require any permits or requirements to be met before an out-ofstate producer can enter the California market. Id.
128. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03.
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environmental or safety effects from a particular industry.129
Courts also focus on the state’s broad powers of protection for
their citizens.130

IV.

DEFENDING AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES TO STATE BASED CLIMATE
CHANGE INITIATIVES ANALYZING NEW
YORK STATE AS A CASE STUDY

Rocky Mtn. v. Corey stressed the importance of states being
able to develop their own climate initiatives to reduce greenhouse
gas.131 Part IV focuses on state climate initiatives within New
York State and what states should consider when drafting or
changing state climate initiatives to avoid constitutional
challenges. Part IV.a discusses the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (“RGGI”). Part IV.b gives an overview of New York
State’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (“NYS RPS”). Finally, Part
IV.c provides an overview of how the implementation of New
York State’s RGGI regulations and the NYS RPS may be
considered by other states in creating climate initiatives to
creatively avoid a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
A. Overview of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI)
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative is an agreement
entered into by nine states in 2005, creating a market-based
regulatory program focused on reducing emissions from the
power sector.132 The program is a state-by-state authorized cap129. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 1356-57 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“We have long acknowledged a distinction between economic
protectionism and health and safety regulation promulgated by Oregon.”).
130. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1980).
131. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107.
132. Exec. Order No. 24, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 7.24 (2009);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-1.1 (2008) (establishing the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative in New York State); Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf
[hereinafter RGGI MOU]; REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI),
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and-trade system that requires regulated electrical power
producers to have a tradable CO2 allowance equivalent to the
producer’s CO2 emissions, which are initially sold at auction.133
In addition, allowances can be sold outside of the auction and
anyone can acquire an allowance, not only the regulated electrical
utilities.134 Allowances act as a form of currency and have a
consistent value across state lines: one ton of carbon is equivalent
to one allowance.135 Proceeds from the quarterly auction can be
used to promote energy efficiency initiatives and renewable
energy research and development.136 States in RGGI agree to cap
emissions at a certain level and reduce emissions by ten percent
by the year 2019.137 The original agreed upon emissions budget
was apportioned among participating states, but the determined
cap has since been modified.138 The modification occurred after
the price of allowances fell between 2009 and 2012 due to a
surplus of allowances available despite the decrease in emissions;
this occurred because of the economic downturn of 2008.139 In
February of 2013, RGGI participants announced the cap for 2014
would be reset from 165 million tons to 91 million tons and the
cap will reduce by 2.5% annually until 2020.140
The goal of states involved in the RGGI program is to
encourage lower carbon intensive electricity production over high
carbon intensive electricity production because of the reduced

http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (An initiative of the Northeast
and Mid-Atlantic States of the U.S.).
133. Bruce R. Huber, How Did RGGI Do It? Political Economy and Emissions
Auctions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 59, 62 (2013).
134. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(4) (2014).
135. Id.
136. Huber, supra note 133, at 78, 86.
137. CHARLES HOLT ET AL., AUCTION DESIGN FOR SELLING CO2 EMISSION
ALLOWANCES UNDER THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE 5 (2007),
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/rggi_auction_final.pdf.
138. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(4).
139. Id.
140. Id.; REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, SUMMARY OF RGGI MODEL
CHANGES 1 (2013), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview
/_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_Summary.pdf (describing that the
Regional Emissions Cap in 2014 will be equal to 91 million tons and that the
Model Rule language maintains the original 2.5% per year reduction to the
regional RGGI cap for the years 2015 through 2020).
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emissions.141 For example, wind produces fewer carbon emissions
than a traditional coal fired power plant.142 RGGI is considered a
major success, and the model has been discussed as a part of the
program framework in a nationwide emissions trading program
within the energy sector.143 Although RGGI has thus far avoided
litigation involving a dormant Commerce Clause challenge,
electricity flows in the interstate market create the potential for
litigation involving the dormant Commerce Clause.144 RGGI
adds a new layer of complexity to a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge because it is not a single state enacting regulations or
standards, but a regional program involving several states.145
One concern with the initial proposal of the RGGI program
regarded the concept of leakage, and how a dormant Commerce
Clause challenge could be brought if a participating RGGI state
tries to protect against the leakage phenomenon.146 Leakage
occurs after in-state electricity producers incur additional
expenses to comply with the cap set by their state, which impacts
prices, leading to cheaper, more carbon-intensive electricity being
imported from non-regulated sources.147 When the memorandum
of understanding was entered into, the participating states
assumed a national cap-and-trade system would be established in

141. See RGGI Benefits, REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE,
http://www.rggi.org/rggi_benefits (last visited Aug. 22, 2014).
142. NICHOLAS BIANCO ET AL., WORLD RES. INST., CAN THE U.S. GET THERE FROM
HERE: USING EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS AND STATE ACTION TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS 9, 11 (2013), available at http://pdf.wri.org/can_us_get_
there_from_here_full_report.pdf.
143. Huber, supra note 133, at 62, 64.
144. See generally 1 STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 6:7.30
(2014). RGGI has been involved in litigation. See, e.g., Thrun v. Cuomo, 976
N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Div. 2013) (“Plaintiffs further asserted that the RGGI
program imposes an unlawful tax upon ratepayers not authorized by the
Legislature, and that the RGGI program, as implemented, is arbitrary and
capricious.”); In re Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 2014 WL 1228509 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (Environmental groups argued N.J. DEC improperly
failed to repeal the rules implementing RGGI in the state after N.J. withdrew
from the program).
145. RGGI MOU, supra note 132.
146. Lawrence Fogul, Serving a “Public Function”: Why Regional Cap-andTrade Programs Should Survive a Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 1313, 1328 (2010).
147. Id. at 1326.
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the near future, which would eliminate the leakage problem if all
states were subject to a uniform national program.148
Unfortunately, since the RGGI program was established, a
national cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gases is still not
in place.
For a RGGI state like New York, leakage is a real threat
because of the coal industry in neighboring states like
Pennsylvania and Ohio.149 RGGI states could curb leakage
problems by implementing requirements on out-of-state energy
producers set up similarly to the LCFS. For instance, a fuel
pathway system calculating the carbon intensity of different
electricity production processes applied in the same way to instate and out-of-state electricity producers could be used in
conjunction with the auction program. The initial pathway
evaluation could create a surcharge for more carbon intensive
producers. It seems the auction model is dealing with the leakage
problem by promoting energy efficiency, thus decreasing the
overall demand of electricity, and therefore, decreasing the
likelihood cheaper unregulated carbon intensive electricity would
be outsourced.150 The potential for leakage is being studied, but
RGGI states have to predict any leakage problems that could
occur and determine what program to implement to prevent
leakage from occurring.151 Adoption of protectionist provisions in
a state such as New York to prevent against leakage could lead to
a better basis for a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.152
Besides leakage concerns, a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to RGGI could be based on the control of commerce
148. William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-andTrade Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in
Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 363-64 (2009).
149. See Huber, supra note 133, at 86.
150. Id. at 86-87.
151. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, POTENTIAL EMISSIONS LEAKAGE
AND THE R EGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS I NITIATIVE (RGGI) 8-9 (2008)
[hereinafter
FINAL
REPORT]
available
at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/
20080331leakage.pdf.
152. ASSEMB. 08872, at 1 (N.Y. 2014), available at http://assembly.state.
ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A08872&term=2013&Summary=Y&Text=Y
(recently proposed bill recognizing how some out-of-state power generators may
have economic advantages over New York state power producers because of
having to purchase RGGI allowances).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/12

24

12_BARON

588

FINAL_EDITED_NUM_USE

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

10/1/2015 10:45 AM

[Vol. 32

outside of the boundaries of participating states, also known as
extraterritorial regulation.153 Healy v. Beer Inst. established that
the dormant Commerce Clause inquiry should be “whether the
practical effect of the regulation was to control conduct beyond
the boundary of the state.”154 The price of electricity for out-ofstate consumers could increase if the consumers purchase
electricity from regulated facilities under RGGI because
regulated facilities have to participate in the auction to purchase
emissions allowances.155 Consumers are protected from drastic
rate hikes by state public utility commissions; however, a
company could still increase rates or pass costs onto consumers.
For example, after approval of such a surcharge by the Public
Service Commission (“PSC”) an emitter could pass costs through
an additional charge on an electricity bill deposited in a fund
directed toward energy efficiency or storm hardening current
infrastructure. Although a rate increase would affect in-state and
out-of-state consumers, consumers living in a participating RGGI
state, like New York, would receive the benefits of the money
collected through the auction process because their electricity
system would be receiving the energy efficiency benefits and
benefits of offsetting projects conducted by utilities. A RGGI
state can even create a consumer benefit program such as one
that benefits low income consumers with energy efficiency
retrofitting in their residence.156 Out-of-state consumers would
receive no such benefit, but instead feel the brunt of any price
increases on their electricity bill. Arguably this is a form of
controlling commerce outside the state boundaries, which would
be in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.

153. See generally Eric Maher, Note, Weathering Rising Seas in a Sinking
Ship: The Constitutional Vulnerabilities of The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 162, 177-79 (2012).
154. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
155. Huber, supra note 133, at 78-79.
156. FINAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 51; Maher, supra note 153, at 185.
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B. Overview of New York State’s Renewable Portfolio
Standard
Many states have developed Renewable Portfolio Standards,
or RPSs, in order to promote development and expansion of
renewable energy resources within their state.157 An RPS is “[a]
statutory or regulatory requirement that a load-serving entity
provide a certain portion of the electricity it supplies to its
customers from renewable energy sources, or any other statutory
or regulatory requirement that a certain portion of electricity
supplied to the electricity grid be generated from renewable
energy sources.”158 The renewable energy can be generated
within the state or procured from out-of-state renewable energy
producers.159 In the original order from the PSC, establishing the
NYS RPS, at least twenty-five percent of the state’s electricity
had to come from renewable sources by the year 2013.160
Renewable technologies that fall within the state’s RPS include,
“biogas, biomass, liquid biofuel, fuel cells, hydroelectric,
photovoltaics, ocean or tidal power, and wind.”161 The PSC
expanded the 25% requirement to 30% in January of 2010, and
the target year for this increase was changed from 2013 to 2015
based on the progress the state was making in increasing the use

157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-245a (2013) (establishing Connecticut’s
RPS program); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A, § 11F (West 2012) (establishing
Massachusetts’s RPS program); OR. REV. STAT § 36.469A (2007) (establishing
Oregon’s RPS program); Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard,
In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y.
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New
York State’s RPS).
158. NY. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6 § 242-10.2(af) (2008) (definition of
Renewable Portfolio Standard).
159. Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause,
the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
259, 261-62 (2008).
160. Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard at 3, In the Matter
of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2004),
available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New York State’s
RPS); see also WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 90.
161. WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 90, at 1.
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of renewable energy.162 Funding for the RPS is obtained when
investor-owned utilities charge a surcharge on customer’s
electricity bills.163 The RPS uses a “central procurement model”
where the surcharge funds collected are given to the New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA),
which implements the programs to meet the RPS reduction
goals.164 There are two tiers within the RPS, the Main Tier and
the Customer-Sited Tier.165 The Main Tier is established to fund
medium to large-scale renewable energy generation projects that
deliver electricity to the wholesale market.166 The CustomerSited Tier is meant to target smaller scale projects such as
individual photovoltaic systems on a customer’s home.167
The RPS was enacted in order to promote in-state energy
production and decrease the amount of out-of-state energy
production New York State relied upon.168 In 2013, NYSERDA
petitioned the Commission to adopt a new order after recognizing
that the economic and environmental benefits of the RPS should
be intrastate rather than interstate.169 NYSERDA asked the
Commission to only grant Main Tier renewable energy projects to
meet the RPS program goals to projects located within the state
of New York.170 This creates a more difficult hurdle for out-of162. See 03-E-0188: Renewable Portfolio Standard – Home Page, N.Y. PUB.
SERV. COMM’N., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/1008ED2F934294AE
85257687006F38BD?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 28, 2014).
163. Id.
164. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 163; NYSERDA, NEW YORK
STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD: ANNUAL REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER
31, 2013 1 (2014), available at http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/
All/1008ED2F934294AE85257687006F38BD?OpenDocument#psc.
165. NYSERDA, supra note 164, at 4.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 2; see also Petition for Modification of Main Tier Program at 1, In
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y.
P.S.C. 2012), available at http://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2014/
03/nyserda-2012-petition.pdf.
170. NYSERDA, supra note 164, at 2; see also Petition for Modification of
Main Tier Program at 1, In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standard,
Case
03-E-0188
(N.Y.
P.S.C.
2012),
available
at
http://statepowerproject.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/nyserda-2012-petition.pdf.
See generally Order Authorizing Customer-Sited Tier Program Through 2015
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state renewable energy producers who want to provide energy to
the New York State market from receiving funding through the
RPS for a project or from receiving production incentives.171
The NYS RPS has main policy objectives that are related to
supporting the economy of New York State.172 The main
objectives include creating jobs, reducing energy costs for
consumers, and promoting investment in-state based projects.173
Although the program has many positive environmental effects
because it reduces harmful greenhouse gas emissions, the
environmental effects are not the focus of the initiative. As
previously stated, the NYS RPS collects funds through the
ratepayers, and those funds then go toward state based programs
and incentives to increase renewable energy use and
production.174
C. Defending against Commerce Clause Challenges to
State Based Climate Initiatives
The decision in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and NYS emission reduction programs are helpful
sources of information for states trying to avoid constitutional
challenges to enacted climate change initiatives that focus on
emissions in the energy sector.175 Although the decision in Rocky
and Resolving Geographic Balance and Other Issues Pertaining to the RPS
Program, In the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E0188, (N.Y. P.S.C. 2010), available at http://documents.dps.ny.gov/
public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7BC05CD0D6-8EA5-4CB9-A9FA6ADD3AECB739%7D.
171. JACKSON MORRIS ET AL., NEW YORK’S RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD:
WHERE TO FROM HERE? 12-13 (2013), available at http://energy.pace.edu/
sites/default/files/publications/RPS%20Report.pdf.
172. See generally NYSERDA, supra note 164.
173. Id. at 3.
174. See generally Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard, In
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y.
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm (establishing New
York State’s RPS).
175. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Heydinger 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL
1612331, at *13 (D. Minn. 2014). Plaintiffs argued the Minnesota’s Next
Generation Energy Act violated the Constitution and was preempted by the
Clean Air Act and Federal Power Act and court found it violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. Id.
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Mtn. v. Corey focused on gasoline, diesel fuel, and various forms
of ethanol produced using renewable feedstock, the LCFS treats
electricity as a transportation fuel since it can be used to power
plug-in electric vehicles.176 A producer of an alternative fuel
under the LCFS, such as electricity, has the option of opting-in
and submitting to regulation.177 After a party opts in they are
able to trade LCFS credits and are subject to the requirements of
the LCFS.178 The regulation requires an electricity fuel provider
to submit a carbon intensity calculation for the electricity a
facility is producing under section 95484 if the facility opts in as a
regulated party.179 Including electricity as a type of regulated
fuel under the LCFS marks a move forward in recognizing the
large part electricity plays in climate change.
Electricity is also taken into account in the lifecycle analysis
of any fuel under the LCFS.180 California actually applies
additional regulations to electricity producers beyond the LCFS
in order to limit emissions. The previously mentioned Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 regulates the electricity being
produced and imported into the state through a cap-and-trade
system that is somewhat similar to RGGI.181
When evaluating the types of electricity a fuel production
facility is able to use, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rocky
Mtn. v. Corey determined although the source of electricity might
be dependent on geographic location, this does not mean the
LCFS is discriminating against out-of-state producers because it
continues to allow the market to function.182 The court notes, “if
producers of out-of-state ethanol actually cause more GHG
emissions for each unit produced, because they use dirtier
electricity or less efficient plants, CARB can base its regulatory
176. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480.1(a)(5), 95480.5(a)(1), 95484(a)(6)
(2010).
177. Id. § 95480.5(a)(1).
178. Tit. 17, § 95480.5(a)(1).
179. Id. § 95484(b)(3)(C)(5) (describing that for electricity used as a
transportation fuel, a regulated party must also submit the following: The
carbon intensity value of the electricity determined pursuant to section 95486).
180. Id. § 95486(a)(2)(E).
181. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(g) (2014).
182. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1092 (9th Cir.
2013).
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treatment on these emissions.”183 For example, a facility near
coal production can use the cheapest most convenient fuel;
however, the dormant Commerce Clause does not “guarantee that
ethanol producers may compete on the terms they find most
convenient.”184
A court analyzing a state’s climate initiative would begin at
the same place the court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey began:
determining whether the measure is facially discriminatory.
RGGI resists a dormant Commerce Clause claim in a similar way
as the LCFS. RGGI does not discriminate facially against out-ofstate electricity producers because such producers can enter the
auction and purchase allowances if they want.185 RGGI also does
not discriminate in purpose or effect because the market
continues to function in a competitive way. RGGI has an
additional strong defense against a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge that the LCFS does not, because the program is not
limited to one state. RGGI involves a collective of several states
enacting the provisions of the program in their own ways,186 and
is considered a major success for cap-and-trade programs because
of the nature of electricity as a commodity.187 Further, in
response to the Pike balancing test, a state involved in RGGI or a
similar program can assert the burdens on interstate commerce
are not clearly excessive when compared to the benefits the states
are receiving in avoiding costs due to climate change caused by
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.188
In addition, any dormant Commerce Clause challenge to
state action for violating extraterritoriality and burdening
commerce outside of the participating state could be defended by
adopting the reasoning in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey. The plaintiffs in
Rocky Mtn. v. Corey tried to argue that the LCFS was regulating
commercial activity outside of California.189 The court of appeals
183. Id. at 1090.
184. See generally id. at 1092.
185. 1 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.04(5)(g).
186. RGGI MOU, supra note 132, at 2.
187. Huber, supra note 133, at 62-64, 93.
188. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137, 142 (1970).
189. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1102-03 (9th
Cir. 2013).
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determined the regulation was not controlling any market
activity outside the state of California because it imposed no duty
on fuel producers to submit to regulation, and did not threaten
civil or criminal penalties for compliance failure.190 A challenge
to state initiatives alleging the regulation impermissibly controls
commerce outside the participating states would be evaluated
under the Healy standard.191 Healy requires the court to
evaluate the direct consequences of the regulation and the
interaction between the regulation and other state’s regulations,
particularly if multiple states or all of the states adopted the
same regime.192
As the LCFS does not require fuel producers outside the state
to submit to regulation by changing their business in any way,
RGGI imposes no duty on utilities to raise consumer prices in
order to participate in the auction or change the way they are
producing electricity.
A utility may choose to change its
production processes if it is economically more feasible for them
to reduce emissions rather than pay for allowances. Finally, the
very goal of RGGI is to act as a model for a potential national
regulatory scheme, and is even somewhat dependent on the
eventual adoption of a national program.193 If a national program
is established, it is impossible for the phenomenon of economic
Balkanization, or separation and isolation of markets, to occur in
violation of the Constitution.
The concern of the district court in Rocky Mtn. v. Goldstene
regarding economic Balkanization is not a real threat in a
program like RGGI where an electricity grid is already arguably
divided into regions or states acting as their own market.194 The
court in Rocky Mtn. v. Corey discredited the lower court’s
Balkanization concern by concluding the LCFS only regulates the
California market and if each state adopted such a regulation, it
would not impermissibly interfere with interstate trade or create
conflicting standards for fuel producers because, “no form of fuel
190. Id.
191. See generally Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
192. Id. at 336.
193. FINAL REPORT, supra note 151, at 12-15.
194. See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp.
2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
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would be excluded from or charged an unapportioned fee to enter
any state’s market, no state would attempt to control which fuels
were available in other states, and no state would peg its fuel
prices or regulatory standards to those of another.”195 A program
like RGGI is similar because electricity producers and those who
want to trade allowances are not prevented from entering the
auction market in any way, and participating states are not
controlling the behavior of electricity producers or limiting the
access of consumers to a particular type of electricity production
outside their own boundaries. If a similar program was enacted
in every state, each state would be able to participate in a
nationwide auction where allowances would have equal value
across state lines, and consumers, who are already limited in
their choice of electricity provider due to geographical limitations,
would not be prevented from purchasing electricity from a chosen
provider.
Also, RGGI’s auction system eliminates problems associated
with cap-and-trade. For example, giving away allowances to
regulated parties has proven to be ineffective in a cap-and-trade
program because it can result in a profit windfall for facilities
because they receive some allowances for free rather than
purchasing them at market price, while the RGGI auction allows
the market to set its own price.196 If a program similar to RGGI
were set up in other regions, or nationally, it would promote the
free market auction of allowances, as well as the development
and use of less carbon intensive energy production. Like the
LCFS, the program is able to avoid a challenge of economic
Balkanization, and it clearly passes the Healy standard because
RGGI is not trying to control commerce outside the boundaries of
the states involved in the memorandum.

195. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1105 (9th Cir.
2013).
196. Huber, supra note 133, at 62, 74.
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D. Jobs: The Trojan Horse of State Based Climate
Initiatives
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges have actually been
litigated against state RPS programs including New York.197
New York State’s RPS program could continue to be attacked if
the Commission allows the program to focus on developing
renewable energy projects and contracts with renewable energy
generators within the state in order to provide economic and
environmental benefits to the people of New York.198 When the
purpose of a regulation is to benefit in-state producers over outof-state producers, it is a per se violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.199
Out-of-state renewable energy producers can still provide
renewable energy that counts towards the RPS goal with the
current structure in place.200 In Rocky Mtn. v. Corey, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals determined the LCFS was not regulating
commercial activity outside of California because it imposed no
duty on fuel producers to submit to regulation, and did not
threaten civil or criminal penalties for compliance failure.201 The
RPS does not require renewable electricity producers outside the
state to submit to any additional requirements.202 The renewable
fuel market continues to function within the state, and the power
197. See e.g., Petition for Rehearing at 1, HQ Energy Servs. (U.S.) Inc. v.
NYSERDA, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y. P.S.C. 2013), available at http://documents.
dps.ny.gov/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7B513E6095-F3C1-4188814E-BD3AF83CE5D6%7D; TransCanada Power Mktg, Ltd.. v. Mass. Dep’t
Pub. Utils., No. 4:10-CV-40070-FDS (D. Mass. 2010) (Partial Settlement
Agreement), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/doer/renewables/solar/
settlement-agreement.pdf.; Bruce Mohl, Bowles Sued on Renewable Policies,
COMMONWEALTH (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/Newsand-Features/Online-exclusives/2010/Spring/Bowles-sued-on-renewablepolicies.aspx (describing how the developer of a wind energy project suing the
state for directing subsidies towards in-state renewable projects through the
Green Communities Act).
198. Endrud, supra note 159, at 270.
199. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013).
200. MORRIS ET AL., supra note 171, at 12.
201. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1102-03.
202. See Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard at 62-63, In
the Matter of a Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, Case 03-E-0188 (N.Y.
P.S.C. 2004), available at www.dps.state.ny.us/03e0188.htm.
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produced by a renewable electricity producer outside the state
boundaries can still be used to meet RPS goals.203 The NYS RPS
does not violate the concept of extraterritoriality, and it does not
have a discriminatory effect on out-of-state renewable electricity
producers.204
If a court found the RPS does not facially discriminate, or
discriminate in purpose or effect, the court would then reach the
Pike test.205 Like RGGI, the limited range of electricity to travel
as a commodity in the market makes the product of electricity
different from traditional transportation fuel regulated under the
LCFS.206 The burden on interstate commerce is very unlikely to
be considered “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits,” because of electricity’s limited range caused by the
physical constraints of the energy transmission system.207 If the
New York State RPS was challenged under the dormant
Commerce Clause in its current form, it is unlikely a court would
find it fails the Pike balancing test.
The NYS RPS is a model for states to consider when drafting
their own RPS, particularly based on recent case law. In North
Dakota v. Heydinger, a Minnesota district court determined
Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act impermissibly
regulated commerce outside the state’s boundaries—a per se
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.208 The regulation
stated that “no person shall . . . import or commit to import from
outside the state power from a new large energy facility that
would contribute to statewide power sector carbon dioxide
203. Id. (“For commerce to occur, the product, electricity generated from
renewable resources, must be in the State to be sold to retail customers. The
RPS promotes interstate commerce by allowing imports on the same terms as
electricity generated within the State. The delivery requirement applies to
domestic Case 03-E-0188 generation as well as imports. Therefore, it is
equivalently applied to in-State and out-of-State renewable generation sources
and imposes only a minimal, if any, burden on commerce.”).
204. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
205. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S 137, 142 (1970).
206. Endrud, supra note 159, at 264 n.34.
207. Id. at 271-72; see generally John R. Norris and Jeffrey F. Dennis, Electric
Transmission Infrastructure: A Key Piece of the Energy Puzzle, 25 NATURAL RES.
& ENV’T 3 (Spring 2011).
208. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 11-CV-3232 (SRN/SER), 2014 WL 1612331,
at *13 (D. Minn. 2014).
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emissions; or enter into a new long-term power purchase
agreement that would increase statewide power sector carbon
dioxide emissions.”209 This type of overbroad language, and the
attempt to regulate interstate power contracts, clearly will not
survive a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.210
The NYS RPS has two additional characteristics that limit
the program’s susceptibility to a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge. First, as previously discussed, the state’s reasons for
implementing the RPS are primarily economic, and the economic
reasons continue to be stressed over the positive environmental
effects.211 Presenting the program in this way makes it much
more approachable to a variety of legislators and more accepted
by the public. However, climate change and environmental
benefits should not be overlooked when creating similar
programs, particularly since states might enact similar programs
in response to the EPA’s final 111(d) rule on carbon emissions.212
The second characteristic is the application of the market
participant exception to the NYS RPS. The state participates in
the market by directly collecting the funds from consumers, and
then NYSERDA determines what projects to fund within the
state.213 The state is arguably directly participating in the
market and not regulating in the traditional sense.214 The state
is merely re-distributing funds collected through resident’s
electricity bills. Therefore, NYS RPS likely falls within the
exception. States creating an RPS program should structure the
program similarly to the NYS RPS to limit dormant Commerce
Clause challenges.
209. MINN. STAT ANN § 216H.03(3) (West 2007); Heydinger, 2014 WL 1612331,
at *3.
210. This type of regulation will also not survive a preemption challenge as
the regulation of interstate power contracts is left to the federal power of FERC
under the Federal Power Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
211. See generally NYSERDA, supra note 164.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1) (2012); Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified
and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79
Fed. Reg. 34,960 (proposed June 18 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
213. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, supra note 162; NYSERDA, supra note 164,
at 1.
214. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 345-46 (2007); White v. Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460
U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
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CONCLUSION

Developing state and national climate change regulations is
of the utmost importance and urgency. With the EPA’s final rule
proposal due in June 2015, states are encouraged to develop
regulations, laws, or programs to comply with the promulgated
greenhouse gas emissions standards.215 However, these new
regulations or state initiatives must fall within the existing
bounds of constitutionality and legality. Specifically, the dormant
Commerce Clause presents a unique threat to comprehensive
greenhouse gas regulation in the absence of federal legislation.
Facing this risk, as states follow a “toolbox” approach in
using various programs to reduce emissions, state regulators
should also follow a “toolbox” approach in drafting emissions
regulation. Best practices for such regulation include clear
language, non-discriminatory and equal treatment provisions for
in-state and out-of-state market participants, and express intent
to regulate carbon for the purpose of mitigating climate change
and the corresponding economic benefits that can occur from
mitigation. California’s ongoing experience with the LCFS and
New York’s success with RGGI and the NYS RPS, demonstrate
the potential for states to act against climate change with
measurable success.

215. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(c)(1).
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